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A robust accountability system is crucial for efficient pub-
lic services provision (Besley and Ghatak, 2003; Cameron, 
2004; Ferejohn, 1986; O’Donnell, 1998). In its standard 
definition, accountability is understood as the process of 
holding authorities responsible for their actions (Finer, 
1941; Mulgan, 2000; O’Loughlin, 1990). Past studies show 
that accountability has a positive impact on governance; it 
ensures that politicians act on behalf of voters (Freire, 
2010; Moncrieffe, 1998), reduces the opportunities for 
rent-seeking and corruption (Deininger and Mpuga, 2005; 
Wenar, 2006), and improves the quality of public services 
(Adsera et al., 2003; Björkman and Svensson, 2009). 
Recent research also suggests that accountability leads to 
higher economic growth because it limits state discretion in 
the economy and increases long-term investments in human 
capital (Benhabib and Przeworski, 2010; Ponzetto and 
Troiano, 2018; Suebvises, 2018).
However, accountability mechanisms extend beyond 
elections. One promising model is that of bottom-up moni-
toring, in which citizens receive information about the 
shortcomings of a given project so they can evaluate and 
pressure underperforming public officials (Kosack and 
Fung, 2014; Molina et al., 2016; Raffler et al., 2018). 
Proponents argue that bottom-up accountability is effective 
because: (a) constituents have first-hand information about 
the outcomes of local policies; (b) citizens have incentives 
to attack corruption that directly affects them; and (c) pol-
icy-makers are sensitive to social punishment from their 
own communities (Serra, 2011: 570). In this regard, bot-
tom-up accountability offers a potential solution to the 
principal-agent dilemma in public service by aligning the 
interests of state officials with those of the constituency 
they serve (Barro, 1973; Raffler et al., 2018).
Here we assess the impact of Tá de Pé (TDP), a mobile 
phone application designed to lower the costs of evaluating 
public works in Brazil. Developed by Transparência Brasil,1 
TDP allows citizens to learn the location of public school 
construction sites, check their completion status, and anon-
ymously request information from competent authorities. 
TDP users can also take pictures of the construction sites 
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and submit them to independent engineers for examination 
(see Figure 1). If the engineers classify the construction as 
delayed, TDP prompts users to send a message to the may-
or’s office asking for completion estimates and explana-
tions about the construction status. TDP has been online 
since April 2017 and was the winner of the 2016 Google 
Social Impact grant with more than 200,000 popular votes.2
We use the TDP app to conduct two experimental inter-
ventions and test the impact of citizen oversight on five 
outcomes related to school completion rates and com-
plaints to public authorities. Overall, providing informa-
tion to citizens has no consistent impact on policy 
outcomes. In the first experiment, we find that the TDP 
app increased the likelihood of construction cancellation 
by 2%, but the result does not replicate. The remaining 
five models have null results. In our second intervention, 
none of the estimations reached conventional levels of 
statistical significance. Importantly, all coefficients are 
small, which suggests that even if the TDP app had a sig-
nificant effect on the outcomes, its substantive impact 
would be negligible.
The findings raise questions about the ability of citizens 
to hold representatives accountable using bottom-up moni-
toring. On the one hand, Björkman and Svensson (2009), 
Lagunes (2018), and Reinikka and Svensson (2005) report 
better policy outcomes after providing information to local 
communities. On the other hand, Banerjee et al. (2010), 
Keefer and Khemani (2014), Lieberman et al. (2014), 
Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2017), Olken (2007), and Raffler 
et al. (2018) find little evidence that information-based 
interventions lead to greater government responsiveness. 
Our results are in line with the latter group and suggest that 
local oversight is ineffective in altering government behav-
ior in Brazil.
The Tá de Pé project
The Tá de Pé3 (TDP) cell phone application is an initiative 
carried out by Transparência Brasil to foster bottom-up 
accountability in the Brazilian public sector. More specifi-
cally, the main goal of the TDP project is to improve 
responsiveness in government education expenditures. The 
TDP app incentivizes citizens to provide up-to-date infor-
mation about unfinished school constructions in their 
neighborhoods, and that information will be assessed by a 
group of independent specialists. If the construction is 
behind schedule, TDP provides a writing platform whereby 
citizens can report to public officials quickly and anony-
mously. The app then writes a notification to the mayor’s 
office, which has 15 days to reply. If the mayor’s office 
does not respond to the request, the app forwards the notifi-
cation to the Brazilian Ministry of Education, making it 
harder for the municipality to access federal funds in the 
future. The motivation behind this intervention is that pro-
viding information to citizens empowers individuals to 
closely monitor public works. This, in turn, results in better 
social outcomes as public agents become more responsive 
to community demands.
Figure 1. The Tá de Pé mobile phone application (a) list of school construction sites close to the users’ location; (b) the school 
construction selected by the user is delayed by 9 months; (c) citizens can add information to the photos they submit via the app.
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Transparência Brasil built the app from January to March 
2017 and tested it in May of that year. The first stable Android 
version was deployed on Google Play on 14 August 2017. A 
version for iOS came about six months later. In October 
2017, Transparência Brasil started a Facebook campaign in 
order to publicize the app. Facebook is the most widely used 
social media network in Brazil with around 72 million users 
(Statista, 2018). The campaigns attracted 2028 new users to 
the platform in October 2017 only.
Transparência Brasil partnered with the Brazilian branch 
of Engineers without Borders (EWB), an independent non-
governmental organization,4 to provide technical assess-
ment of school completion rates based on user-submitted 
photos and GPS coordinates. The engineers’ reports are 
later uploaded to the TDP database and stored on the users’ 
mobile devices so citizens can follow the progress of the 
reported constructions.
The TDP also received feedback from Brazilian com-
puter scientists and policy analysts. In 2017 and 2018, 
Transparência Brasil announced two team programming 
competitions, called “Tá de Pé Hackathons”, where con-
tributors could fix code bugs and suggest new functionali-
ties to the TDP project. One of these innovations consists of 
a Twitter bot (https://twitter.com/tadepeapp) which posts a 
message on the social network each time a user submits 
a new picture for evaluation or a municipality responds to a 
citizen’s request. This allows any interested parties, includ-
ing those who do not use the TDP app, to check the state of 
school construction sites.
Experimental design
Between August 2017 and July 2019, we implemented two 
interventions to measure the effect of the TDP app on five 
school construction outcomes plus a placebo test. The out-
comes are: (a) a placebo outcome indicating the percentage 
of the project completed before the impact evaluation 
started; (b) the percentage of the project completed by the 
end of the interventions; (c) the difference between the per-
centage reported as completed before and after the inter-
ventions; (d) the number of finished constructions; (e) the 
number of cancelled constructions; and (f) the number of 
schools where construction companies updated the conclu-
sion dates. Table 1 depicts the expected effects for each of 
the studied outcomes.5
The first intervention was carried out from August 2017 
to July 2018 using the Android version of TDP. The rand-
omization was conducted at the municipal level. We ran-
domly selected 344 municipalities to the control group and 
included 2642 in the treatment group. Our control condi-
tion consists in removing all information about school con-
struction from the TDP app in the chosen municipalities, so 
that citizens were unable to report constructions in the con-
trol municipalities.
To evaluate the random assignment, we used the follow-
ing pre-treatment variables: (a) log of municipal population 
in 2015; (b) log of number of poor families in each city; (c) 
log of total federal transfers to the municipality in 2016; (d) 
federal government indicator for primary school quality; 
and (e) federal government indicator for secondary school 
quality. The data come from the Brazilian Ministry of 
Education and the 2010 Brazilian Census. Balance tests 
show that the randomization was successful and further 
details are available in the supplementary material online.
We also conducted two manipulation checks and ana-
lyzed the number of TDP app downloads by municipality 
and over time. Figure 2 displays the results and indicates 
that the treatment has good territorial variability. There are 
Table 1. Outcomes and expected effect of the TDP intervention.
Expected impact Meaning
Placebo:
Percentage of the project completed before the 
impact evaluation started
Null The placebo outcome, as reported before the 
intervention, should have a null impact. This 
represents the absence of differences between 
treatment and control prior to the intervention.
Outcome 1:
Percentage of the project reported as 
completed by the end of the intervention period
Positive If the intervention has a positive effect, the firms 
should increase their efforts toward finishing the 
construction more quickly
Outcome 2:
Difference between the percentage reported as 
completed before and after the intervention
Positive If the intervention has a positive impact, the 
difference between before and after the intervention 
should reflect this
Outcome 3:
Dummy indicator for finished constructions
Positive If the intervention has a positive effect, more schools 
should be reported as finished in the treatment group
Outcome 4:
Dummy indicator for cancelled construction
Negative If the intervention has a positive impact, fewer 
constructions should be abandoned and reported as 
finished in the treatment group
Outcome 5:
Number of schools where construction 
companies updated the conclusion dates
Positive If the intervention has a positive effect, firms and 
mayor’s offices should be responsive to the public, 
and update their finishing dates
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455 downloads in the 1023 municipalities in the treatment 
condition. Downloads peak during the Facebook TDP cam-
paign, launched in October 2017, then diminish in the fol-
lowing months. Overall, 6092 users downloaded the app 
during intervention 1.
The second intervention is similar to intervention 1 in all 
but three characteristics. First, the TDP app was then avail-
able for both Android and iOS devices. Second, we rand-
omized the intervention at the school level, with 659 control 
and 3717 treatment units. We used blocked randomization 
stratified by Brazilian states, school construction status 
(under construction, stopped, unfinished), and whether the 
municipality spent more on school construction than the 
distribution median. Finally, the intervention period lasted 
from August 2018 to July 2019.
Balance tests and manipulation checks were also suc-
cessful for intervention 2. In total, 443 municipalities 
downloaded the app. There were about 1000 user down-
loads in August 2018, right after intervention 2 started, and 
a second spike around December (see Figure 3). The app 
Figure 2. Manipulation checks for intervention 1 (a) geographical distribution of the treatment condition; (b) number of TDP app 
downloads from August 2017 to July 2018.
Figure 3. Manipulation checks for intervention 2 (a) geographical and (b) temporal variation of TDP app downloads from August 
2018 to July 2019.
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gained 4078 new users during intervention 2. The number 
of downloads is smaller in this second intervention as there 
was no associated social media campaign in that period.
Data from Google Analytics suggest that users did 
engage with the TDP app. On average, each user launched 
60 app sessions, which indicates their interest in the appli-
cation. In total, the app had 53,928 screen visualizations, 
with an average of 2.42 screen visualizations per session.
We estimate all models using the following regression 
equation:
Yi i i i iX Z= + + + +      α β γ θ εT
where i indexes the experiment units. Yi is one of the six 
outcomes described above, α is the intercept, β denotes the 
average treatment effect, and Ti is a binary treatment indi-
cator. γ is a vector of fixed effects, Xi is a matrix of Brazilian 
states’ fixed effects, θ is a vector of controls, and Zi an array 
of controls for the case i. The error term is denoted by εi. 
We cluster the standard errors at the municipality level as 
mayors are responsible for school investment decisions in 
Brazil.
Results
Table 2 summarizes the main results of intervention 1. Each 
column represents the treatment effect of the TDP app on 
one of the outcomes we measured for this study. All models 
reported here include the five control variables described in 
the previous section and Brazilian states’ fixed effects. We 
also estimated the models without control variables, with-
out fixed effects, and with nearest-neighbor matching. The 
results are very similar to those below.
We find that the app only has a small effect on cancella-
tion rates. The TDP application increases the likelihood of 
cancelling the construction by 2.07%. While this result goes 
in the opposite direction of our theoretical expectations, the 
finding is inconsistent and does not replicate in the second 
experiment. All other coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels. On the one hand, the results 
indicate that our placebo outcome, the percentage of the 
projects completed before the intervention, indeed behaves 
as predicted. On the other hand, we expected the five 
remaining outcomes to improve after the introduction of the 
app. The literature on bottom-up accountability argues that 
delivering more information about the shortcomings of pub-
lic services provision will put citizens in a position where 
they can monitor state agents and improve provider behav-
ior (Raffler et al., 2018). Our results do not lend support to 
that hypothesis.
Table 3 shows the results of the second intervention. The 
treatment does not have a statistically significant effect on 
any of our outcomes of interest, including the placebo. This 
raises further questions about the effect of the TDP app on 
school completion. Note that the effect signs are also incon-
sistent with improving the outcomes, which demonstrates 
that our results do not derive from low statistical power or 
the reduced control group size.
Figure 4 shows the results of our randomization infer-
ence tests. Randomization inference allows us to estimate 
the probability of the sharp null hypothesis over all possible 
randomizations that could have occurred under our research 
design (Coppock, 2019; Gerber and Green, 2012). We fail 
to reject the null in all but the finished school indicator in 
experiment 1.
We also note that effect sizes are small in all estimations 
and that the coefficients flip signs in all but one of our six 
dependent variables. This provides further evidence for the 
null results: not only would the app have a low impact even 
if the treatment were significant, but the results could go 
against what the bottom-up accountability theory predicts. 
At least in the school construction outcomes we investigate 
here, we find little evidence that grassroots monitoring 
works in the context of school constructions in Brazil.














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ATE −0.99 −1.12 −0.13 0.002 0.02 0.05
 (2.59) (2.96) (1.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2986 2986 2986 2986 2986 2926
R 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.13
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01.
Cluster-robust SEs at the municipality level. ATE: average treatment effect.
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Discussion
In this paper, we discuss whether delivering information to 
citizens via a mobile phone application fosters community 
oversight and political accountability in Brazil. Our two 
interventions show that the results are at best mixed. 
Although we find some treatment effect on school cancel-
ling rates in the first intervention, the app has no consistent 
impact on our outcomes of interest. These findings add to 
the studies that cast doubts on the relationship between 
bottom-up accountability and local policy performance 
(e.g. Banerjee et al., 2010; Lieberman et al., 2014; Raffler 
et al., 2018).
What factors, then, are driving these results? It seems 
unlikely that the null results derive from flaws in the 
research design. First, our study is well powered. Although 
the treatment is indirect—the person has to download the 
app, find a school construction, and then report it—we 
included a substantial number of schools in the treatment 
groups. Second, balance and manipulation tests indicate 
that the treatment allocation was successful, so we can rule 
out problems in the randomization procedures. Third, data 
from Google Analytics confirm that citizens indeed used 
the app and provided information to our dataset. This indi-
cates that the treatment manipulation was effective. In this 
sense, it is unlikely that our results derive from low user 
response. Fourth, after doing a series of robustness tests, we 
still find no firm evidence of treatment effect. Finally, note 
that the signs of the coefficients are frequently contrary to 
our theoretical expectations. This rules out a possible con-
cern about statistical power with our small control group 
approach.
We discuss some possible reasons why community mon-
itoring did not work in our case. One plausible explanation 
is that individuals were unable to differentiate the effect of 
political corruption from those of spending cuts. Due to the 
severe economic crisis in 2014–2016, the Brazilian federal 
government introduced discretionary spending limits that 
affected public investment (Rossi and Dweck, 2016). 
Politicians may argue that delays in school constructions are 
not derived from their misuse of government funds but from 
the austerity measures. If this is the case, citizens will not 
blame local politicians for the underprovision of public 
goods. Consequently, representatives can dismiss individual 
requests as the issue is unlikely to escalate.
The electoral cycle might also have decreased the poten-
tial effect of the treatment. As the experiment was fielded 
right after Brazil’s municipal elections, incumbents might 
have disregarded the requests because they did not see the 
demands as politically costly in the short run. Having just 
taken office, mayors might have focused their attention on 
the formation of government coalitions or on budget con-
cerns. Future research may evaluate how electoral dynam-
ics interact with citizen oversight, potentially by replicating 
informational experiments in different stages of the politi-
cal cycle.
In sum, our experiments suggest that popular participa-
tion and bottom-up monitoring may not be effective to 
improve public service delivery in the case of school con-
structions in Brazil. Nevertheless, the null findings are 
informative to researchers and policy-makers. The most 
important recommendation derived from this study is that 
interventions targeting elite groups, such as lobbyists or 
civil servants, might render better school construction out-
comes than those focused at the community level. Another 
core lesson is that although digital interventions are prom-
ising means to deliver information, perhaps they do not 
have the same impact as personal, face-to-face communica-
tion. Since many developing countries share Brazil’s issues 
with education provision, the shortcomings we describe 
here serve as warnings for future interventions. Finally, 
whether this study generalizes beyond school constructions 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ATE −1.33 −2.26 −0.94 −0.001 0.01 0.002
 (1.45) (1.56) (0.61) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3226 3226 3226 3226 3226 3109
R 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.09
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01.
Cluster-robust SEs at the municipality level.
Inverse probability weights computed by the randomizr R package. ATE: average treatment effect.
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to other bottom-up programs, and to other contexts, remains 
to be studied.
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Notes
1. Transparência Brasil is a non-governmental organization 
whose mission is to “promote transparency and social con-
trol of public power”. It has been active since April 2000, 
receives no public funding, and is non-partisan. More infor-
mation at http://transparencia.org.br (accessed July 2019).
2. About 1000 Brazilian charities participated in the 2016 
Google Social Impact Challenge. An independent commit-
tee selected 10 organizations as finalists, and Transparência 
Brasil won the challenge with about 200,000 popular votes. 
To know more about the contest, please visit https://impactch-
allenge.withgoogle.com/brazil2016 (accessed July 2019).
3. Tá de Pé is an informal Brazilian expression for “is it done?” 
Literally, it means “standing on its feet” in Portuguese.
4. Please visit http://www.ewb-international.org for more infor-
mation about Engineers without Borders International and 
https://esf.org.br for information on the Brazilian office.
5. Please refer to the supplementary material online for further 
details on the treatment implementation and the coding of the 
outcome variables.
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